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Abstract 
 
The regional reform is due for Storting decision in 2007-08. It is facing an uphill battle if new 
regions are not to enjoy popular legitimacy. Can regional reform act as a vehicle to restore 
confidence in our representative system? First, the paper discusses three types of challenges 
facing the Norwegian democracy today, and which the reform ought to address. These are 1) 
the future of the representative system, 2) the inherent complexity of public sector, 3) the 
nature of “wicked problems”. The second part of the paper concerns theoretical approaches 
which may widen the ongoing debate on the item of regional reform. We contend that 
anchoring of the reform in theories emphasizing the procedure as equivalent to result of 
political processes is a vital success criterion The paper discusses two relevant theories in this 
respect: reflexive law and constitutional theory, drawing the conclusion that reflexive law 
opens an opportunity to view the shortcomings of both public as well as market regulation of 
the welfare services in a historical context. Constitutional theory offers a way to make the 
reform a consensus reform rather than a permanent battlefield for varying regimes, i.a. by 
outlining procedures for negotiated contracts between state and different regions. 
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 1. The upcoming reform – a democratic reform?  
 
The subject of regional reform in Norway has come a long way. There is definitely not any 
popular demand for it, and in many of the counties and even more with the regional state 
representatives (Fylkesmannen) the opposition is strong. A look at reports produced on the 
item in later years tells that it is not seen primarily as a democracy reform (NOU 2000:22, 
NOU 2004:2, NOU 2004:19).Various governments have analysed the subject. Number one 
objective of reform is improved efficiency in public sector administration, value for money, 
how to avoid redundancy in public offices etc.  Number two seems to be economic 
development, or more precisely the creation of new jobs in order to conserve the level of 
population and dwellings all over the country.  
 
Regional reform logically touches base with every part of the public sector since it very much 
concerns the distribution of tasks and duties between state, region and municipality. Perhaps 
the most intreaging question lies in the relationship between political and marked-like 
administrative bodies; which role is to be exerted by the elected politician in the future? 
Regional reform must therefore be seen also as a democracy reform. We shall here discuss 
three challenges for the future democratic system, namely the representative system, the 
complexity of the modern society, and thirdly the way the politico-administrative system 
struggles with “wicked problems”. How can reform address these challenges? In chapter 3 we 
turn to theories which seems useful in analyzing the subject, weight given to the place of law. 
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 2.  Challenges to be adressed 
2.1 Present state of the representative system 
 
The backbone of democracy is a representative system of elected ombudsmen, politicians, 
who are capable of planning, deciding and carrying through programmes on a basis of a 
popular mandate. Makt – og demokratikommisjonen (The power and democracy commission) 
in its concluding report (NOU 2003:22) highlights the fragmentation of the state and the 
subsequent power loss of representative government. Astonishingly this has not stirred a lot of 
political debate, making us ask whether politicians are comfortable with this power drainage. 
The obvious linkage between the conclusions of Makt- og demokratikommisjonen and the 
item of regional reform is seemingly not observed; that the reform if successfully carried 
through could mean a strengthening of the elected politician, generally speaking. Already in 
the 80ies, trend researchers found a move from representative models towards individual 
voice and client group pressure. Few politicians seem to bother about the danger posed by the 
undermining of representative institutions which may result in a 
more accidental and biased distribution of wealth and benefits. This situation occurs when 
politicians are squeezed and the power vacuum is filled with micro level user or client groups 
which voice their private subjective opinions. Contrary to representative bodies these are not 
designed to balance conflicting opinions and care for those who are not letting their voice 
heard.  
 
A regional reform is an overhaul of the public sector and of vital parts of the welfare state. 
Therefore the role of the elected politician should be at the forefront of the debate, the 
question of the balance of power between central state and regional as well as local political 
entities. Regional reform should be seen as a reaction to the findings of “Makt- og 
demokratikommisjonen”, a means to remedy emerging flaws, notably in accountability 
structures.   
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 2.2 Complexity – and the declining steering ambition 
 
The post industrial society represents an unprecedented volume of societal entities; public, 
quasi-public, civil or private. The interactions between them are hard to grasp for most 
people. What should trouble politicians today is that citizens are often bewildered when they 
face an increasingly fragmented picture of the public sector. The complexity has grown 
parallel to the growth of the welfare state system. It poses a real challenge to the quality of 
democracy, as it spills over to the ability of accountable persons or institutions to monitor 
decisionmaking processes as well as implementation of decisions.  
 
Sand (1996) shows how the combination of a comprehensive public sector and economic 
internationalization has brought to the fore the limits to the problemsolving capacity of the 
state. The situation is exacerbated by the striking societal role of knowledge professions, 
which by virtue of sheere expert competences exert a growing influence over decisionmaking 
processes. Sales of knowledge by consulting firms is normal. Sand’s crucial conclusion is that 
the state no longer can be managed from one clearly defined power centre. Welfare state has 
reached a limit, financially as well as qualitatively. Hierarchical authoritative steering systems 
do not work well any more. Its future depends on its ability to draw upon opinions, 
experiences, and preferences among employees, users and clients, in addition to advice 
offered by relevant interest organizations and expert environments. In the literature on the 
item the term governance is used as distinct from traditional government.  
 
Under this governance regime the central political system (Storting and Regjering) is facing 
the reality that its potential of planning and executing democratic decisions is very restricted. 
The far-reaching delegations to specialized agencies, state hospitals, state companies (i.a. 
transport and oil/energy production) are telling proofs of this development. Having the 
discussion under point 1.1. above in mind, the question of burden- and powersharing between 
central and regional political bodies can be seen as a question of how to reinstall a clearer, 
more transparent, political steering system. If the regional reform means strengthening 
decisionmaking powers of regional politicians, this will entail curbing powers of bodies which 
today act fairly independently, and whose accountability is hard to supervise (i.a. hospitals). 
Thus, if the Storting is to transfer powers to the regional level this is not necessarily going to 
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be at the Storting’s own expense, rather at the expense of specialized agencies and the 
magnitude of semi-autonomous bodies in the field. If this holds true, the citizen’s picture of 
public sector would be more transparent, improving the accountability and, ultimately, 
legitimacy of the public sector.  
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 2.3. Wicked problems and the central level’s impotence 
 
It was  Rittel and Webber (1973) who first used the terms of ”tamed” and ”wicked” problems, 
later refined by Harmon and Mayer (1986) and Klausen (2001). The public sector formerly 
used to handle  
 
“malleable problems, the ones that could be attacked with common sense and 
ingenuity ….. (these) have in recent decades given way to a different class of problems 
…….. the problems with no solutions, only temporary and imperfect resolutions” 
(Harmon & Mayer, 1986).  
 
According to Harmon and Mayer tame problems can be solved because they can be readily 
defined and separated from other problems and from their environment. Wicked problems, on 
the other hand, have no definite formulation and hence no agreed-upon criteria to tell when a 
solution is found. The public institutions have always had to tackle wicked problems, like the 
poverty problem, which preoccupied the sector at a very early date. The intriguing thing is 
that the agenda of wicked problems rather seems to grow than shrink at a time when the 
welfare state is nearly all-encompassing. Look at the following list: environmental problems, 
childhood environment (i.a. drop-out rates in schools), drugs, crime, new mental and physical 
illnesses resulting from modern lifestyles, immigration and the handling of multi-ethnicity. 
Klaudi Klausen (2001) places tame and wicked problems at the two ends of a continuum, 
stretching from “simple to complex situations and problems”, from consensus as to ends and 
means, over to disagreement about the understanding of the problem, about goal-setting, and 
consequently about its suggested resolutions. 
 
A typical feature of wicked problems is that they cannot be solved without involvement from 
parties external to the public entity which “owes” it. A drop-out from high-school cannot be 
turned around without cooperation from family or friends. Drug-related crime involves the 
local community; its willingness to fend off receivers of stolen goods and to witness to police 
about observed abuses.  
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The concern for such type of challenges in our modern society is strong in the parliament a 
government. But these institutions fall short of an adequate handling of these complex 
problems, and the sooner they admit it the better. The path-finders to solutions must be found 
at the regional or local levels, which brings us to the item of decentralization. The Storting has 
now got a chance to empowering the lower levels in the welfare system, entrusting them by 
forging laws that proceduralize citizens’ active engagement in tackling i.a. wicked problems. 
Often we hear that people now are more private and individual, and that few really want to 
spend time and energy to the benefit of their fellow community. The counter-question is this: 
is the system organized in such a way that citizens’ contributions are welcome? 
 
It is logical to draw upon the distinction between input and output type of democracy in 
democratic theory (Scharpf, 1999). For our purpose here we put aside the position of output 
democracy, since it is principally less interested in the participatory, preference formation 
aspect of democracy. Goodin, in discussing input democracy elaborates on ‘democratic 
deliberation within’, which is the systematic endeavour by regional and local political systems 
to have people understand actual others. Preference formation is coloured by a set of social 
practices (Goodin, 2003). Initiating such practices should always be a task of representative 
bodies, in the closest possible collaboration with civil society structures. Today, 
representative systems are mostly preoccupied by the outputs of processes. They may 
underestimate the popular potential for participation in preference formation, a potential 
which can be brought to use in resolving the heavy collective agenda. Citizens who feel that 
“the system” does not bother to listen may end up in aversion and dislike of politicians, 
paving the road for less, not more, valuable popular involvement.  
 
We draw the following conclusion:  solution of complicated questions in the modern society 
is not to be found at central level only, but by a concerted effort giving due regard to local 
people. Good solutions will entail heavy involvement from persons and groups at local level. 
The regional reform could bring to an end the Storting belief that such challenges can be 
tackled by whitepapers or propositions issued and discussed in Oslo. A consensus in this 
respect could envision a new era for the regional and local level in politics.  
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3. Theoretical guidelines for reform (I): 
 
The place of law in pursuing an alternative regional structure and power distribution 
 
The question we now ask is this: how can law contribute to enhancing the steering capability 
in the modern society? Laws regulate conflicts and establish expectations among members of 
the society concerning acceptability of actions. Hence law acts as a coordinating mechanism. 
Laws are norm-based. Law establishes meaning to peoples’ lives, and as part of that reduce 
complexity. Growing complexity is a striking feature of the post-modern society. For 
instance, when it comes to public services vital to a person’s life to tell who is responsible for 
what is hard. Subsystems become more specified, making action coordination between them 
increasingly difficult (Luhmann, 1982). Lawmakers are running the risk that implementation 
of laws cannot be adequately controlled, raising accountability questions. Viewed from a 
democracy angle reduction of complexity become vital on this background.  
 
Historically law is subjected to a major change as state takes on an increasingly heavy burden 
of responsibilities as the welfare state becomes an historic reality. We shall examine closer the 
concept of reflexive law (Teubner, 1982, Sand, 1996). For the item we are discussing in this 
article reflexive law is particularly interesting because it emphasises the procedural aspect of 
law. From three various theoretical departures Teubner elaborates a meta-theory on the 
subject. Teubner builds on Niklas Luhmann, Philippe Nonet, Philip Selznick, and Jurgen 
Habermas.  From Luhmann (Luhmann, op.cit.) he extracts the theories about complexity in 
society. While law used to treat one problem at a time, law today must reckon with the 
complexity when numbers of separate systems operate simultaneously with different goals 
and mechanisms. This phenomenon is termed differentiation of society. Luhmann’s system 
theory describes a society where central functions like politics, law, economics no longer are 
knit together by a universal value-based authoritative system. Functions are seen as 
differentiated, normatively closed. Hierarchy is replaced by heterarchy. From Nonet and 
Selznick (1978) Teubner extracts the concept of responsive law. Through evolutionary stages 
law develops from repressive (the authoritarian, pre-modern state) via autonomous 
(Rechtsstaat) to responsive law (the ambitious welfare state). Responsive law is supposed to 
be open and close to realities, implying coordination within democratic frames and 
delegations from state to lower, often decentralized levels. Lastly Teubner builds on 
Habermas and his theories on communicative rationality (Habermas, 1987). 
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 The main feature of reflexive law can be summed up:  
 
It is based on the assumption that modern society is divided in numerous rapidly developing 
specialized levels and strata, horizontally as well as vertically. This type of development 
makes external normatively based regulation difficult. The central state level will lack 
sufficient detailed insight in the operations at lower levels. Hence political steering and 
administrative regulation should reflect the knowledge and insight which only those close to 
reality possess. Various entities i.a. within public sector thus is given relative autonomy via 
devolution or delegations so as to handle the coordination of interests and conflicts in 
decision-making processes. Decentralization following from this is partly motivated by the 
desire to improve efficiency. The traditional hierarchical steering model is not any more that 
effective.  
Secondly reflexive law builds on the idea of communicative rationality within public entities, 
ensuring popular participation and public deliberations. Reflexive law aims at institutional 
design which rather regulate procedures than the contents of decisions.   
 
Juridification of welfare benefits takes place at a fast rate today, leaving less space for 
political judgement at local or regional level. Being an international wave juridification is 
seen as a way to relieve the political system of decisionmaking responsibility, displaying great 
trust in the legal system’s ability to handle complex social issues. Reflexive law is an 
alternative to juridification. Habermas, in discussing the phenomenon, establishes the 
distinction between law as “medium” and as “institution”. Law as welfare state steering 
medium overestimates the potential of law in deciding the material conditions of citizens 
(Habermas, 1987), and tend to destroy communicative structures in the action field concerned. 
This is the situation that occurs when persons neglect participation in social interaction, such 
as community activities. They are addressed by state as individuals possessing legal right to 
material benefits, contributions or services. Law as “institution” may promote communicative 
structures, if citizens are addressed not as clients or customers, but as valuable contributors in 
activities which build social capital. Law in this regard is first and foremost concerned about 
the input side of democracy, setting up procedures such as hearings, site visits, procedures for 
conflict regulation, discursive meaning formation processes. This covers Teubner’s 
understanding of reflexive law as regulating self-reflection processes for societal systems such 
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as the political system. Importantly, this implies that political steering takes place by 
decentralization without abandoning the steering ambition. Let us quote Teubner: 
 
“The question is whether we are dealing with command and control regulation through 
state economic policy or with regulation through decentralized mechanisms of self-
regulation. In the latter case the law of the state regulates only the contextual 
conditions” (Teubner, 1993:67) 
 
Reflexive law as alternative to market regulation 
 
According to Dalberg-Larsen (1988) law as regulation medium has evolved in six phases 
since 1800.  
1. market regulation (‘invisible hand’), liberal or autonomous law, (Rechtsstaat) 
 
2. late 1800: state intervention (Bismark) 
 
3. 1900: working class enters stage, laws as rights of ordinary people, full civil rights 
 
4. 1930-ties: second step in state interventionism provoked by market failure 
 
5. 1945 – 70: peak period of welfare state 
 
6. today: full-scale welfare state confronted by criticism as to inefficiency, lack of 
democracy, lack of customer sensitivity. 
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 A travel through these phases shows us the limits to what can be achieved by regulation via 
Rechtsstaat, allowing the market to operate unhindered, or by the interventionist welfare state. 
Today we are therefore struggling with the elaboration of a regulation modality which is 
something different, obviously a mix of the two, but the recipe not yet found. The option of 
reflexive law must be considered in this light. 
 
The roots of reflexive law can be traced before phase one when people where “organized” in 
autonomous groups with state as a loose and fragmented structure. Law was then often 
repressive, authoritarian, but at the same time characterized by custom and usage (“sedvane”), 
a sort of self-regulation society free from either market forces or state regulation.  
 
Theoretically, we may pretend that society can be subject to regulation in three different 
manners (Dalberg-Larsen, op.cit.): 
 
• via market 
 
• via state intervention 
 
• via self regulation (i.a. custom and practice based) 
 
There is of course in any society a mix of the three: 
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 Self-regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public regulation       Market regulation 
 
 
 
Today we may consider legal regulation via the two lower angles more or less to have 
exhausted their potentials. Public regulation as modality reached its peak in the 70-ties. We 
have now experienced the “blue wave” for the last 25 years, and many see negative results 
emerging from it as an argument for more, not less, political governance. Neither increased 
public regulation nor market regulation offer the full answers to the challenges of the modern 
society. One should therefore look upwards toward the self-regulation angle. It should be 
brought in, not in the sense of a return to old days type of self regulation, but rather as a 
means to reinvigorate democratic processes, deliberative practices entailing meaning and 
preference formation where “wicked problems” type of cases are targeted. Here reflexive law 
comes in, as an alternative to increased market regulation as a seventh phase in the 
relationship between law and society. Far from an abdication from the overall responsibility 
central state will by this regulation modality demonstrate its manifest desire to attack evils of 
the modern society in a new and more up-to-date manner. It will deliberately transfer power 
to regional (or local) democratic bodies (law as institution), adopting laws which will form the 
basis for a more systematic popular involvement than hitherto. This entails above all being 
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serious about drawing upon popular insight and propensity to contribute to solving wicked 
problems, enlarging social capital, and fostering a well functioning living environment. A 
prerequisite thus is that central state recognizes the consequences of the above triangle.  
 
As stated above, reflexive law is a principle alternative to material law, the latter envisaging 
detailed distribution schemes, based on classic economic and utilitarian philosophies. 
Reflexive law brings us to rethink the material distribution of our society and the obvious 
inadequacies of material law in regard to solving many of today’s most pertinent social 
challenges. If reflexive law is to be introduced the decisionmaking process matters a lot, the 
sequence of decisions. This takes us to constitutional theory.  
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 Theoretical guidelines for reform (II) : 
 
Constitution or contract as the juridical instrument for the regulation of state – region 
relationship 
 
In reflexive law constitutive and procedural rules dominate over action rules. Therefore, as a 
theoretical approach, reflexive law concerns procedure more than end results of political 
processes. This takes us logically to constitution theory. A constitution can be defined like 
this: 
”A constitution is, broadly, a set of rules, written and unwritten, that seek to establish 
the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions of government, regulate the 
relationship between them, and define the relationship between the state and the 
individual. The term is also used more narrowly to refer to a single, authoritative 
document, the aim of which is to codify major constitutional provisions”. 
(Heywood, 2002:292). 
 
Constitutions explain why formal entities when regarded as political institutions are durable 
and stable. In outlining reforms in a modern society it is of great importance to distinguish 
between constitution and contract as two principally different institutions. The theory 
distinguishes between institutional environment and institutional arrangement. Institutional 
environment refers to rules in a social system, framing the space of action; that is the 
constitution. Institutional arrangements, on the other hand, refers to organizational methods 
which agents may use to coordinate their actions within frames defined by the constitution; 
that is the contract. The constitution is more of a social order, a convention, which makes the 
contract institution feasible. The constitution does not solve specific issues, but establishes 
conventions meant to facilitate the cooperation between societal actors as needed. To establish 
a constitution, in itself, is an act of coordination meant to bring order. Constitutions, unlike 
contracts, are not maintained by external (coercive) sanctions by courts. Constitutions mirror 
norms and opinions which enjoy widespread legitimacy in the society concerned (Knudsen, 
1997). 
 
A crucial aspect (Rawls, 1971) is that those persons who decide a constitution (legislators) 
will not ex ante be in a position to evaluate whether a rule as part of a constitution will be of 
future benefit to him/her. This follows from the fact that the constitution is not detailed 
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(contrary to the contract) and it is impossible to foresee its long-term implications. Therefore 
political agents may agree to a social rule because she/he deems its consequences for the 
society as positive, without necessarily obeying to the same rule when confronted with it as an 
individual or group. Constitutions therefore are agreed upon by parties with diverging 
political ideologies and views. This is a strong argument why modern societies faced with 
challenges related to the formation of democratic structures ought to turn to constitution 
theory. 
 
The time dimension is critical in any constitution. The constitution is seen to solve time 
incontinence problems. These occur when agents along the time axis commit actions which 
are inconsistent, suboptimal, or even irrational in relation to the mission of an institution. The 
constitution limits the future action alternatives of the actors. This done, parties may relax and 
invest resources in the institution, protecting its existence. Constitutions prevent 
shortsightedness, myopic behaviour, since parties mutually guarantee that certain types of 
behaviour or conduct will not take place. Constitutional theory terms this phenomenon 
precommitment strategy (Knudsen, op.cit.). 
 
EU learnings pertinent to the Norwegian discussion 
 
In the ongoing discussion on the item in our country EU-learnings are brought in as premises 
for alternative proposals for a new type of governing system (Veggeland, 2005). Any such 
discussion in Norway must have the constitutional Norwegian unitary state as its principle 
starting point. The Constitution does not recognize autonomous sub-national authorities, thus 
federalism is not an issue. When regional reform is taking up the issue of transfer of power to 
regional counties we always speak of delegated powers to political authorities. As stated 
earlier in the paper it is an empirical fact that central state is relieving itself of responsibilities 
by delegations to autonomous public or semi-public administrative entities, often market-like 
structures, of which we have a multiplicity. The question we therefore raise is this: why not 
delegate to sub-national representative authorities just as well as to administrative bodies? 
When it is today commonplace to delegate to market-like structures one may argue that 
national politicians just as well could delegate to lower political representative bodies, since 
in both cases we are speaking about a weakening of central level’s powers. Undoubtedly we 
see here an overall strategic power struggle between market forces and its political supporters 
on one side, and those who fight for politically steered structures on the other. The squeeze of 
the elected politician is of course not an accident, rather an internationally led trend 
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(OECD,IMF,World Bank). A vital democracy does not always coincide with desires of 
private sector interests, and notably those of the larger, transnational corporations (Perkins, 
2004, Bakan, 2002). 
 
Veggeland’s normative position is the need of strong regions in Norway, more along lines of 
the EU regional system. We shall not in this paper go into the EU context. But the principal 
thinking conveyed by Veggeland is very interesting. His definition of a strong region is 
worded like this: 
 
- a population with common identity 
 
- an innovative and competitive business sector 
 
- certain freedom to establish public funding, beyond what is allocated for running 
legal-based services to the population (elbow room for taxation) 
 
- politically founded in a vital local democracy, ensuring the region’s legitimacy, and 
with the ability to mobilize social processes and giving direction to the region’s 
development. 
 
Referring to the French case Veggeland emphasizes two important principles for a multilevel 
steering system: 
 
- principle of subsidiarity 
 
- principle of reciprocity 
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 These have their origin in federal systems, but in today’s complex environment they are 
pertinent even in unitary states going for task- and burden-sharing between three levels, as in 
France and Norway. In the case of France the central level recognizes the lower levels as 
counterparts with which to negotiate reciprocal contracts. Veggeland makes a strong case for 
a reform starting by establishing 
  
1. the area of unique regional authority 
  
2. the area of joint state – region authority 
 
The latter would be defined as a multilevel coordinated, in real terms negotiated, authority.  
Negotiated contracts between state and regional counties could be a decisive part of the 
reform. Veggeland sees this as separate agreements for each of the new regional counties 
(based on population, remoteness or other features). These agreements as negotiated contracts 
will hence differ in the range of  responsibilities and tasks. The Storting will assume greater 
responsibilities for the remoter regions with low population density.  In that way the Storting 
avoids running the risk that the reform ends up with unacceptable differences and inequalities 
between various geographical parts of the country, potentially damaging to the political 
legitimacy. The contracts would include specifics pertaining to financing modalities (i.a. 
taxation) and responsibility-sharing. 
 
Constitution theory’s relevance for the Norwegian case 
 
Once the Norwegian political system is embarking on a major overhaul of the political-
administrative structure the long-term viability of reform ought to be highlighted. The reform 
is not an answer to popular demands and is far from enjoying full support in the Storting. If 
now the reform fails to attract support from regional and local political-administrative levels, 
it may be lacking legitimacy. Veggeland speaks about contract. Referring to the above 
discussion of principle properties of the constitution institution versus the contract institution, 
we believe that advocates of reform appropriately could draw upon constitution theory to 
flesh it out. Following items could be covered and forming its institutional environment, 
adopted by the Storting: 
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 1. Principles of subsidiarity: decisions to be taken close to and by involvement from 
those affected. 
 
 These principles would give guidelines for the distribution of tasks and responsibilities 
between the three levels, clarifying broadly the areas of unique regional authority. Examples: 
regions responsible for college education, communications (apart from typical national 
undertakings), subsidies to regional/local industries and businesses. 
 
2. Principles of reciprocity: outlining the procedures for negotiations of contracts as 
separate agreements between state and the regional counties. 
  
Here the Storting will decide on principles concerning the extent of state involvement, 
financing and duration of contracts as institutional arrangements within these constitutional 
frames. Hierarchical authoritarian rule can be replaced by dialogue, with the potential of 
strengthening the mutual trust between the three levels.  
 
Precommitment strategy 
 
As stated above an important integral part of constitution theory is precommitment strategy. 
Norwegian politics is often characterized by arguments over who is responsible for policies at 
regional and local level. In spite of the powers decentralized to the lower levels Storting 
members often – and especially during election campaigns – enter the stage of local politics. 
They would often blame local politicians for shortfalls which are due to state budget 
limitations. On the other hand they take praise for affaires carried through by regional or local 
boards. This behaviour undoubtedly is a source of inadequate transparency in the sector 
causing confusion among voters. As of today the Storting has got the power to instruct 
regions without legal barriers. Every year we have i.a. a discussion in regard to the amount of 
earmarked/not earmarked transfers to regional and municipal levels. Introduction of 
constitutional thinking may bring about a change. Hardin puts it this way: 
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 ….”the point of establishing a constitution (……..) is to put obstacles in our way to 
force us to move along certain paths and not others. It enables us the more readily to 
organize ourselves for progress, rather than to dissipate our energies in random 
directions” (Hardin, 1989:116). 
 
Under the suggested constitutional rules the members of the Storting will have to respect 
some restrictions on their actions related to the two lower levels. The costs connected with 
accepting these restrictions would apply to Storting members of contrasting opinions about 
the role of the lower levels. They cannot any longer act at their own discretion in intervening 
in politics in the regions. Presumably we would as a result see regions standing out with a 
clearer and more accountable role versus the electorate. This is a considerable gain in times of 
growing corruption and unethical conduct even in public sector. Representative politics in 
general would come out as a winner. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In Norway today we can observe how elected politicians struggle to retain their traditional 
position as a power centre amidst growing complexity and a heavy collective agenda of 
“wicked problems”. Traditional decision-making structures are overburdened. The state 
apparatus is relieving itself of responsibilities by establishing directorates, autonomous state 
companies, and numerous control entities. Regional reform should be seen as part of the same 
type of governance thinking taking up the vital issue of the distribution of tasks and 
responsibilities between the three vertical levels of the political representative system; state, 
region, municipality. Lawmakers can in this situation consider following two options: 
 
• Stick to, in principle, similar distribution of responsibilities and tasks between state – 
regional county – commune as today, making sure they do not rid themselves of power 
in the form of direct steering instruments. Correspondingly they will experience, as 
hitherto, a gradual erosion of their power base, as concluded by the Makt og 
demokratikommisjonen, the vacuum left being filled not by political bodies but by 
administrative and market-like structures. 
 
• Go for transfer of powers to regions as discussed in this paper. 
  
The reform may benefit from drawing upon reflexive law and constitution theory as 
theoretical tools. The links between the two are obvious. We are according to Dalberg-Larsen 
(1988) at an historic crossroad. Central authoritarian hierarchical welfare state is not going to 
resurface. Either we continue along the marketization direction, on which we have embarked 
to a considerable degree already, or, alternatively, the Storting can take the reflexive law 
route, turning towards more self-regulation in the regions. This can be done by establishing an 
institutional environment – written in law – which regulate the overall long-term relationship 
between the state and regional counties and communes. Carried through along these lines the 
reform could be a winning project both for national as well as for regional politicians. The 
Storting facing power losses anyhow will emerge on top of democratic challenges of our time. 
Regional politicians will emerge as more powerful and accountable. 
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